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19831 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
submitted that the Weiner decision aligns New York with the
more progressive view of the employment relationship with no con-
comitant undue hardship on the employer.
Daniel P. Venora
Evidence obtained through a police informant in a noncustodial
setting must be suppressed if the police knew that the defendant
was represented by counsel on a pending, unrelated criminal
charge
The New York Court of Appeals traditionally has afforded a
broad construction to a criminal defendant's right to counsel. 151
The right to counsel attaches when the accused requests the aid of
an attorney, when formal proceedings against the defendant com-
mence, or when an attorney enters the proceeding, 152 and state-
to agree to this as a condition of their employment. Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891. The
employer can protect himself by entering into a written contract explicitly stating that the
employment is at will, id. at 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891 n.24; see Novosel v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (relying on the exception elicited in
Toussaint to find no right of "just cause" dismissal for employers); DeGiuseppe, supra note
112, at 48, for "[i]f the employment agreement expressly permits a discharge for any reason
whatsoever, courts would, under contract theory, be helpless to protect the employee from
abusive discharge," HASTINGS Note, supra note 113, at 1455.
151 Note, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 351,
351 (1982). The Court of Appeals has described as "a cherished principle" the right of the
defendant under the state constitution to place an attorney between himself and the "awe-
some power of the sovereign." People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613,
412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978); see N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the right to counsel in New York has developed independently of the sixth amendment
guarantee contained in the federal Constitution. 46 N.Y.2d at 161, 385 N.E.2d at 615, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 877. As a result, a defendant, in many respects, has a broader right to counsel
under New York law than he does under federal law. See Galie, State Constitutional Guar-
antees and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 157, 178 & n.149 (1979).
Exemplifying New York's broad interpretation of the right to counsel is the rule that
once the right to counsel attaches, the defendant cannot effectively waive his privilege
against self-incrimination or his right to counsel, unless the waiver is made in the presence
of an attorney. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976). This principle has been said to "[breathe] life into the requirement that a
waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent and voluntary." Id.; accord
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 29, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (1980);
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422
(1980).
152 In the early 1960's, the Court of Appeals expansively defined the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination as those rights are embodied in the state consti-
tution. The Court held that upon the indictment of an accused, formal proceedings com-
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ments thereafter made to police in the absence of an attorney are
suppressible.15 This "indelible" right to counsel has been extended
mence, prohibiting interrogation by police in the absence of the accused's lawyer. People v.
Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 166 N.E.2d 825, 827, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (1960); People v.
Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447-48, 216 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74-75 (1961); see
also People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 102, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962)
(statements made by the defendant after arraignment and in the absence of counsel are
inadmissible). See generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 547, at 539 (J. Prince 10th ed.
1973). Subsequently, the right to counsel was extended to interrogations taking place prior
to the commencement of proceedings. In People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d
628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), for example, the police interrogated the defendant but refused
to allow the attorney, who had been retained by the family of the accused, to see the defen-
dant. Id. at 150-51, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842. The Court excluded statements
made by the accused after such access was denied. Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243
N.Y.S.2d at 842. This rule was refined in People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366,
250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964), the Court holding that when an attorney is denied access to his
client, all statements made by the defendant both prior to and after the denial are inadmis-
sible; if, however, the police afford the attorney access to the accused, only those statements
made subsequent to the attorney's entry into the proceedings may be suppressed if made in
the absence of counsel. Id. at 182, 199 N.E.2d at 368, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In People v.
Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965), the Court further ex-
tended the right to counsel, stating that any questioning of the defendant is impermissible
once the attorney makes it known to the police, even through a telephone call, that he is
representing the defendant. Id. at 232-33, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see Peo-
ple v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968) (ap-
pearance of attorney, regardless of lack of formal retainer, results in attachment of right to
counsel).
The Donovan-Arthur cases were substantially overruled in People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d
155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795 (1970), and it was not until 1976 that
the Court overruled Robles and reaffirmed its support for Donovan-Arthur. See People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485-86, 341 N.E.2d 894, 899-90, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423-24 (1976);
see also The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 201, 218-19 (1976). Subsequent decisions ex-
panded and defined the right to counsel when proceedings have not yet commenced. See,
e.g., People v. Marrero, 51 N.Y.2d 56, 59, 409 N.E.2d 980, 981, 431 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (1980);
People v. Garafolo, 46 N.Y.2d 592, 600, 389 N.E.2d 123, 127, 415 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813-14
(1979); People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 461, 377 N.E.2d 721, 725, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269
(1978). In addition, the post-arraignment/post-indictment rule was modified in People v.
Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), wherein the Court ruled
that "a criminal action begins with the filing of an 'accusatory instrument.'" Id. at 339, 320
N.E.2d at 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 890; see, e.g., People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 400
N.E.2d 1344, 1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1980) (felony complaint); State v. Lanahan, 55
N.Y.2d 711, 717, 431 N.E.2d 624, 627, 447 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (1981) (arrest warrant); see
also CPL §§ 1.20(17), 100.05, 120.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
"53 See generally R. PrILER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE §§ 10.65, 10.66, at 530-32
(1972). A violation of a defendant's right to counsel generally manifests itself in the form of
an inadmissible confession. See id. § 10.65, at 530; CPL § 710.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983); infra note 202 and accompanying text. Often, however, an improper pretrial identifi-
cation may constitute grounds for finding a violation of the right to counsel. See CPL §
710.20(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); infra notes 201 & 203 and accompanying text. The
suppression of either type of evidence also may result in the inadmissibility of "derivative
evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree." R. PIrLER, supra, at 531. It should be noted that a
1983] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
to protect defendants who are represented by counsel in pending,
unrelated criminal matters,154 as well as to those who are ques-
tioned in noncustodial settings.155 Recently, in People v. Knapp,156
motion to suppress may be made at any time after the commencement of the action, CPL §
710.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), and sometimes can be made during the course of
the trial, id. § 710.40(2); cf. id. § 440.10(h) (violation of the defendant's state or federal
constitutional rights constitutes grounds for vacating a conviction).
154 See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22
(1979). A long-standing exception to the Donovan-Arthur rule, see supra note 152, has been
applied to defendants who were represented by counsel on unrelated charges. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 329, 266 N.E.2d 630, 632, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1971) (statements
concerning a murder uttered by defendants while they were in jail and had been assigned
counsel to represent them on unrelated robbery charge, held admissible); People v. Hether-
ington, 27 N.Y.2d 242, 245, 265 N.E.2d 530, 531, 317 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1970) (although defen-
dant informed police that he "had" a lawyer in another case, this does not cause right to
counsel to attach). This exception was recognized when the Donovan-Arthur rule was rein-
stated. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22
(1976); see supra note 152. Subsequently, however, in People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397
N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979), the Court of Appeals eliminated the exception, holding
that "even when the interrogation concerns unrelated matters," the accused has a right to
the presence of counsel. Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The Court rea-
soned that an attorney's role is to protect his client's rights, and therefore, "[it cannot be
assumed that an attorney would abandon his client" merely because the attorney represents
him only on an unrelated matter. Id. After Rogers, several cases further defined when the
right to counsel attaches for a defendant who is represented by an attorney on an unrelated
charge. In People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981),
the Court determined that if an investigating officer knows that the defendant had been
arrested in the recent past, the right to counsel attached, even though the officer was una-
ware that the defendant actually was represented on a separate, pending charge. Id. at 229,
423 N.E.2d at 373, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 896. Additionally, if the officer knew that the defendant
had been arrested several months earlier, and assumed that the accused was represented by
counsel on the earlier charge, statements made by the defendant in the absence of counsel
are suppressible. People v. Smith, 54 N.Y.2d 954, 955-56, 429 N.E.2d 823, 824, 445 N.Y.S.2d
145, 146 (1981). In People v. Servidio, 54 N.Y.2d 951, 429 N.E.2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 143
(1981), however, the Court held that statements made by the defendant in the absence of an
attorney are admissible if the officer was unaware of the pending, unrelated charges. Id. at
952, 429 N.E.2d at 822, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Furthermore, in People v. Kazmarick, 52
N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981), the Court stated that the police could
question the defendant in the absence of counsel since, although formal adversary proceed-
ings against the defendant had begun on an unrelated charge, he was not in fact represented
by a lawyer on that charge. Id. at 324, 420 N.E.2d at 46-47, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49. See
generally Note, The Uncounselled Confession: A New York Variant, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 343, 369-72 (1979); Note, supra note 151, at 360-63.
155 Under the post-arraignment/post-indictment rule, any questioning of the accused by
the police after arraignment or indictment rendered the defendant's statements inadmissi-
ble, unless the interrogation took place in the presence of counsel. See supra note 152. No
distinction was made between questioning which took place while the defendant was in cus-
tody and interrogation which occurred in a noncustodial setting. See, e.g., People v. Rober-
son, 41 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 359 N.E.2d 408, 410-11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (1976); People v.
Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 103, 359 N.E.2d 402, 406-07, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1970). In People
v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969), however, an "in custody"
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the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its commitment to interpret
broadly the right to counsel as it exists under the state constitu-
tion, holding that evidence obtained through a police informant in
a noncustodial setting must be suppressed if the police know that
the defendant was represented by counsel on a pending, unrelated
criminal charge. 157
In Knapp, Linda Velzy, an 18-year-old college student, disap-
peared from the small town of Oneonta, New York. 158 A missing
person's investigation was initiated by the state, city and college
campus police. 15 Over 100 persons were interviewed by the police,
including the defendant, Ricky Knapp, who denied having knowl-
edge of the missing girl's whereabouts. 6 0 At the time of his ques-
tioning, Knapp was under indictment on unrelated criminal
charges, and was represented at his arraignment by John Owen, a
prerequisite to the attachment of the right to counsel was superimposed upon the Donovan-
Arthur rule. Id. at 27-28, 250 N.E.2d at 41, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 540; see W. RICHARDSON, supra
note 152, § 543, at 542-44; Note, supra note 154, at 360. The determination of whether the
defendant was actually "in custody" depended upon whether he reasonably believed that he
was free to leave. See People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 449, 255 N.E.2d 164, 166, 306
N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1969).-
Recently, the "in custody" requirement has been applied in a less rigid manner. In
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980), for example, the
defendant's attorney had instructed the police not to speak with the defendant outside the
presence of counsel. Id. at 27, 417 N.E.2d at 502, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 208. Two detectives, who
had gone to the defendant's apartment to deliver an order to show cause, sensed the defen-
dant's eagerness to speak and began to question him. Id. After being read his Miranda
warnings, the defendant made admissions to the officers, which he later refused to repeat at
police headquarters. Id. at 27-28, 417 N.E.2d at 502, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The Court, recog-
nizing that the defendant's retention of an attorney indicated his inability to deal with the
situation alone, id. at 31-32, 417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211, stated that the "right
[to counsel] is rendered illusory if the State's agents are permitted to subject an individual
represented by counsel to questioning in a noncustodial setting," id. at 35, 417 N.E.2d at
505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 213. Judge Jasen dissented, emphasizing that the defendant chose to
invite the officers into his home and that the police did not actively interrogate the defen-
dant. Id. at 35, 417 N.E.2d at 507, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
Judge Jasen opined, though a retreat in the recent expansion of the right to counsel is not
contemplated, there was no "demonstration that there is an imbalance or inadequacy in
existing law which must be remedied by the creation of a broader rule." Id. at 33, 417
N.E.2d at 506, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
2- 57 N.Y.2d 161, 441 N.E.2d 1057, 455 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1982).
187 Id. at 175-76, 441 N.E.2d at 1062, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
1- Id. at 168, 441 N.E.2d at 1058, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
29 Id. The three police departments involved in the investigation coordinated their ef-
forts through a central command post. Id. The search for Linda Velzy was an intensive
investigation, 82 App. Div. 2d 971, 971, 440 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (3d Dep't 1981), receiving
widespread publicity and massive media coverage, 57 N.Y.2d at 177, 441 N.E.2d at 1063, 455
N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Meyer, J., concurring).
1 0 57 N.Y.2d at 168, 441 N.E.2d at 1058, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
public defender. 6' As a result of a police request that the defen-
dant undergo a polygraph test concerning the Velzy disappearance,
Knapp contacted Owen, who advised the defendant not to submit
to the test.162 The police questioned the defendant three more
times, 63 until Owen telephoned Detective Angellotti, an Oneonta
police detective, and requested that the police either arrest the de-
fendant or cease questioning him. 6 4 Subsequently, an informant,
Arthur Hitt,'69 agreed to aid the police in their investigation of the
defendant's involvement in the Velzy disappearance. 6 Knapp
later admitted to Hitt that he had killed Velzy, and requested
Hitt's aid in moving the body. 6" Hitt alerted the police, who, after
the defendant and Hitt returned to the latter's logging site with
the body, arrested Knapp."6" In addition to making inculpatory
statements at the logging site,6 " Knapp waived his right to counsel
Id. at 169, 441 N.E.2d at 1058, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. Owen contacted Detective Angellotti on December 15 or 16, 1977. Id. In addition
to directing the police to discontinue the questioning of his client, the defendant's attorney
informed them he had told Knapp not to submit to the polygraph test. Id.
165 Id., 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Arthur Hitt owned a logging site and
occasionally employed Knapp. Id. Hitt's attorney informed the police that his client had
been asked by Knapp to provide an alibi for him for the night Linda Velzy disappeared. Id.
At the time, Hitt was unaware of the reason for Knapp's request. Id. at 169-70, 441 N.E.2d
at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
166 Id. at 170, 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541. On December 21, 1977, a confer-
ence was held at the county courthouse which was attended by the county court judge, the
prosecutor, Hitt, and Hitt's attorney. Id. The resulting agreement was that, in exchange for
Hitt's cooperation in the Velzy investigation, Hitt, who was facing felony charges, would be
permitted to plead guilty to a reduced charge and would not be sentenced to incarceration,
provided his cooperation led to the arrest of at least one person. Id.
167 Id. at 170-71, 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Prior to the conversation in
which the admission by Knapp was made, Hitt made several telephone calls and had several
face-to-face meetings with Knapp. Each of these conversations was recorded by the State
police. Id. On December 31, 1977, 10 days after the agreement between the prosecutor and
Hitt was consummated, Knapp admitted to Hitt that he had killed the missing girl. Id. He
related the details of the murder, explaining that he picked her up while she was hitchhik-
ing, and that they had a sexual encounter. Id. Afterwards, she jumped out of the car and lay
on the side of the road in a semiconscious state. Id. He put her back into the car and told
her that he was going to take her to the hospital, but instead, drove her to a neighboring
county, hit her in the throat three times with his fist and killed her. Id. The defendant also
stated that he wanted to move the girl's body to Hitt's logging site, and Hitt agreed to assist
him. Id. at 171, 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541. This entire conversation, unlike
the earlier ones, was not recorded. Id. at 170, 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
168 Id. at 171, 441 N.E.2d at 1059, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Hitt alerted the State Police
that he and the defendant were going to move the body and, on the basis of this informa-
tion, the police set up a stakeout. Id.
161 Id. There was police testimony to the effect that the defendant, as he was being
1983]
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and made a full confession at the State Police station.17 ° Based
upon Hitt's sworn testimony of Knapp's admissions, the police ob-
tained a warrant to search the defendant's car,1 71 where additional
physical evidence was discovered. 172
The trial court denied suppression of the defendant's various
admissions and his confession made to the police, as well as the
evidence seized from the defendant's car.17  The appellate division
affirmed the admission of this evidence, except with respect to the
typewritten confession obtained at the police station, holding that
such confession had been obtained in violation of the defendant's
right to counsel. 7 4 The conviction nevertheless was affirmed on a
harmless error analysis.175
On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's con-
viction and remanded the case,'7 0 holding that, in addition to the
typewritten confession, Hitt's testimony as to Knapp's admissions
and the physical evidence obtained from the defendant's car were
inadmissible. 7 7 Judge Jones, speaking for a plurality of the
Court,17 8 initially stated that the State Police could be charged
wrestled to the ground, said "'I am sorry; I am sorry. I killed her. I am no good. Please
shoot me.'" Id.
"Io Id. The defendant was taken to the State Police station where, after being given
Miranda warnings, he waived his right to counsel and confessed to killing Linda Velzy. Id.
The full confession was typed and signed by the defendant. Id. at 171, 441 N.E.2d at 1059-
60, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 541-42.
171 Id.
1-72 Id., 441 N.E.2d at 1060, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Uncovered in the search of the defen-
dant's car was a contact lens, wood chips, cat and dog hairs, blonde human hair, and "glit-
ter." Id. All of this evidence subsequently was matched with items found on the dead girl's
body. See id. at 171 n.1, 441 N.E.2d at 1060 n.1, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 542 n.1.
173 Id. at 172, 441 N.E.2d at 1060, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 542. The tape recordings of the
defendant's conversations with Hitt were not offered in evidence, although Hitt was permit-
ted to testify, over objection, as to the statements that Knapp made to him the day before
Knapp's arrest. Id.
'74 See People v. Knapp, 82 App. Div. 2d 971, 971, 440 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (3d Dep't
1981).
17l Id. at 971-72, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The appellate division held that there was "no
reasonable possibility that [the] admission of [Knapp's signed] confession contributed to
defendant's conviction." Id. Justice Mikoll dissented from the affirmance of the conviction,
but nonetheless agreed that the confession should not have been admitted. Id. at 972, 440
N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Mikoll, J., dissenting).
176 57 N.Y.2d at 175-76, 441 N.E.2d at 1062, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
177 Id. at 173-74, 441 N.E.2d at 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 543. The Court of Appeals held
that the statements made by the defendant at the logging site were admissible since they
were "spontaneous." Id. at 173, 441 N.E.2d at 1060, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
178 Judge Jones was joined in the opinion by Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Fuchsberg.
In a separate opinion, Judge Meyer concurred in the result. Judge Wachtler wrote a dissent-
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with knowledge that the Oneonta police had been directed by
Knapp's attorney to stop questioning the defendant.'7 9 Thus, since
Hitt was acting as an agent of the State Police,'80 the plurality con-
cluded, the admissions made to Hitt as well as the physical evi-
dence gathered pursuant to the search warrant issued on the basis
of his testimony, were obtained in violation of the defendant's
state constitutional right to counsel."8 Notably, Judge Jones de-
clined to express any opinion as to the dissenting judges' proposed
"emergency exception" to the right to counsel. 82 The Court in-
stead observed that since the issue was not addressed in the lower
courts, an investigation of the "implications and ramifications of
such an exception" was precluded.183 Furthermore, the Court
stated that the application of an "emergency exception" would de-
pend upon a "preliminary factual determination," which the re-
cord of the case would not allow it to make as a matter of law. 8 4
Concurring, Judge Meyer opined that he "harbor[s] no doubt
that there is an emergency exception to the constitutional right to
counsel and when next presented with the opportunity to do so
will vote in favor of such an exception."'8 15 Judge Meyer disagreed,
however, with the contention of the dissenting judges that, as a
matter of law, this case fell within that exception.186 Rather, Judge
ing opinion in which Judge Gabrielli concurred. Judge Jasen dissented separately.
179 57 N.Y.2d at 173, 441 N.E.2d at 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
180 Id. The Court concluded that Hitt was acting pursuant to the agreement made in
the County Judge's chambers, and that the State Police directed and supervised Hitt in his
role as informant. Id.
181 Id.; see supra note 152.
182 57 N.Y.2d at 174, 441 N.E.2d at 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 543; see infra notes 185-95
and accompanying text.
183 57 N.Y.2d at 175, 441 N.E.2d at 1061-62, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
18l Id. The information available to the Court as to whether the use of Hitt as an in-
formant was in furtherance of the search for Miss Velzy, or whether it was in reality an
effort to gather evidence of criminal activity on the part of the defendant, was not deemed
by the Court to be "so overwhelming as to compel the conclusion that the purpose of the
December 21 conference in the County Judge's chambers and the use of Hitt by the police"
was primarily to find the missing girl. Id. In addition, the plurality, though acknowledging
the extensive nature of the search for Miss Velzy, recognized that other factors, such as the
time period from her disappearance to the subsequent agreement between Hitt and the po-
lice, as well as the nature of the agreement itself, may have indicated a less than hopeful
attitude about finding her alive. Id.
"I Id. at 176, 441 N.E.2d at 1062, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (Meyer, J., concurring).
186 Id. at 176-77, 441 N.E.2d at 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Meyer, J., concurring). Judge
Meyer stated that to hold as a matter of law that a "deliberate court-sponsored invasion" of
one's right to counsel is justified merely because the purpose of an investigation is to find a
missing person "is to permit the exception to swallow the rule and to violate Knapp's right
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Meyer asserted that the defendant's right to due process entitles
him to an opportunity to contest the factual basis upon which the
emergency determination rests.18 7
Judge Jasen dissented, contending that "a very real practical
distinction" exists between an investigation which is designed to
locate a missing person and one which simply is geared toward es-
tablishing a suspect's involvement in the commission of a crime.1 8
He thus urged recognition of an emergency exception," 9 or at least
a limitation upon a further broadening of the right to counsel in a
noncustodial setting, where practical realities render a per se rule
of inadmissibility inappropriate.190 Similarly, Judge Wachtler, in a
separate dissent, argued that an "emergency exception" to the
right to counsel should be applied in cases involving a missing per-
sons investigation. 91 Judge Wachtler contended* that a police in-
vestigation for a missing person is distinguishable from a criminal
investigation, 92 since the primary concern in the former is the vic-
to due process in order to justify the violation of his right to counsel." Id. (Meyer, J.,
concurring).
187 Id. at 176, 441 N.E.2d at 1062, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (Meyer, J., concurring). Judge
Meyer indicated that" 'due process'" clearly entitles [the defendant] to contest whether his
[admission] of December 31st to Hitt, improperly obtained as it otherwise clearly was ... ,
obtained in a manner within that emergency exception." Id. (Meyer, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted). Judge Meyer stated that the question of whether an "emergency" exists de-
pends upon various factors, including whether there is in fact a missing person. Id., 441
N.E.2d at 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Meyer, J., concurring). The establishment of that fact
alone, however, does not guarantee, according to Judge Meyer, that the designation of the
situation as an "emergency" is warranted. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring).
I" Id. at 179, 441 N.E.2d at 1064, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge
Jasen observed that expanding the right to counsel in the missing person situation "[will]
elevate the rights of the potential defendant above the compelling interests of the State."
Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
lag Id. at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Judge Jasen agreed with Judge Wachtler that by reason of the designation of the police
activity as a missing person investigation, an emergency existed as a matter of law. Id. at
178 n.**, 441 N.E.2d at 1063 n.**, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545 n.** (Jasen, J., dissenting).
190 See id. at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Judge Jasen contended that an emergency exists in a missing person investigation since "the
police [must] act expediently in the hope of finding a person whose life may be in danger
and who may be in need of immediate assistance." Id., 441 N.E.2d at 1064, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
546 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 180, 441 N.E.2d at 1064-65, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
Judge Wachtler contended that the police should be permitted to use an informant when
they are attempting to render assistance to a person in danger. Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Judge Wachtler asserted, the police are justified in assuming that a person is
in need of their assistance when there is a report of a missing person under unusual circum-
stances. Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 182, 441 N.E.2d at 1066, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge
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tim's rescue, and not merely the gathering of evidence for a subse-
quent prosecution. 19 3 Thus, Judge Wachtler stated, "[u]ntil the
[victim] has been found, or conclusive evidence of death has been
presented,'19 4 the right to counsel may not be used "to frustrate or
delay" the police investigation. 195
The emergency exception to the right to counsel, as proffered
by four members of the Knapp Court, is based upon an analogy to
the fourth amendment exception which permits the admission of
evidence obtained through a warrantless search.19 e The fourth
amendment's emergency exception is, in essence, an acknowledg-
ment that a suspect's constitutional rights at times must yield to
the state's interest in protecting life 97 or property.198 Similarly, the
Wachtler noted the primacy of the police function of preventing crime and aiding those in
danger, and placed the prosecutorial function of gathering evidence in a secondary position.
Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 1066, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge
Wachtler distinguished several of the cases relied upon by the plurality, stating that none of
them involved the threat of imminent danger to an innocent victim. Id. (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
194 Id. at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 1069, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 185, 441 N.E.2d at 1068, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
IB See id. at 183-84, 441 N.E.2d at 1067, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
There are various exceptions to the fourth amendment's protection against unlawful
searches and seizures. See generally Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and
Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 571, 571 (1975). The emergency
doctrine is one such exception which recognizes that policemen at times must act in a man-
ner reasonably necessary to promote their function as peace officers. See United States v.
Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1973). As an aspect of this function, the police, who
are required to aid those in need, inadvertently may come upon evidence which normally
would not come to their attention. See, e.g., Id. at 204; United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972). This type of evidence is admissible, even though the police
enter certain premises without a warrant, since the emergency justifies the entry. See, e.g.,
People v. Kelly, 83 App. Div. 2d 648, 649-50, 442 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (3d Dep't 1981).
197 See People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 180, 347 N.E.2d 607, 611, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246,
250, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); Note, supra note 196, at 584. In Mitchell, the Court
of Appeals recognized that "[c]onstitutional guarantees ... must yield to paramount con-
cerns for human life and the legitimate need of society to protect and preserve life." 39
N.Y.2d at 180, 347 N.E.2d at 611, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court
concluded, a police search for a hotel maid in every room of the hotel was justified, even
though no warrant was obtained, since it was not known at the time whether a crime had
been committed. Id. at 177, 347 N.E.2d at 609, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
2" See People v. Manzi, 21 App. Div. 2d 57, 59, 248 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (1st Dep't 1964);
Note, supra note 196, at 584-88. The emergency doctrine rarely has been held to apply in
situations where the protection of property is the motivation for violating the fourth amend-
ment right to privacy, Note, supra note 196, at 585, since such right usually is deemed the
more important interest, id. at 584. In Manzi, the police witnessed a person breaking into
the defendant's car. 21 App. Div. 2d at 58, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 308. Because the car window was
broken, the police took the property which was inside the car to the police station for safe-
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judges of the Knapp Court who believe that an emergency excep-
tion to the right to counsel should be recognized indicated that
significant state interests might override a criminal defendant's
right to counsel.19 9 Whereas the fourth amendment merely protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures,0 the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel safeguards not only the right to representa-
tion, but also the right to a fair trial201 and the privilege against
self incrimination.20 2 To be sure, the denial of the right to counsel
prior to trial "[m]ight well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
keeping, and later determined that it had been stolen. Id. at 58-59, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 308. The
evidence was held admissible. Id. at 59, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 308. See generally Note, supra note
196, at 586.
"9' See supra notes 191-93 and text accompanying notes 189 & 191.
2oo See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 455 (1971). The Supreme Court has referred to the fourth amendment as a "safe-
guard of [the] privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmen-
tal officials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). In fact, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures has been defined by the expectation of privacy concern-
ing the area and property to be searched. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967).
201 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205 (1964); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 345 (1957). In Massiah, the Court stated
that a confession "deliberately elicited by the police after the defendant had been indicted,
and thereafter at a time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's help," constituted
grounds for reversal of the conviction. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 325 (Douglas, J., concurring)). After a lengthy discussion of Spano, the Mas-
siah Court observed:
It was pointed out that under our system of justice the most elemental concepts of
due process of law contemplate that an indictment be followed by a trial, "in an
orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by
all the procedural safeguards of the law." It was said that a Constitution which
guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial could surely vouchsafe no
less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely
extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less, it was said, might deny a defendant "ef-
fective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him."
377 U.S. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). In
Wade, the Supreme Court held that "the assistance of counsel at [a pre-trial identification]
lineup was indispensable to protect [the defendant's] most basic right as a criminal defen-
dant-his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully
cross-examined." Wade, 388 U.S. at 223-24. Indeed, stated the Court, "the accused is guar-
anteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, for-
mal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's
right to a fair trial." Id. at 226.
202 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d
148, 152, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1963); see also People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976); Note, supra note 154, at
370.
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trial itself to a mere formality."203 It therefore appears that the
dissenters' analogy to the fourth amendment 0 4 is dubious in that a
right-to-counsel emergency exception would be far more sweeping
than its fourth amendment counterpart.205
The Knapp dissenters also implied that the potential for sup-
pression of evidence obtained from a person who is represented by
counsel will be a cause of concern to the police in their search for
203 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The constitutional guarantee of
counsel means more than simply the effective assistance of counsel during trial and the
availability of counsel to an indigent defendant. Id. at 224-25. It includes aid at critical
stages prior to the trial itself, as well as "assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaning-
ful 'defence.'" Id. at 225.
204 See 57 N.Y.2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 1067, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (Wachtler, J., dis-
senting). Judge Wachtler analogized the emergency exception, as it relates to the right to
counsel, to situations in which an individual may be questioned without first being informed
of his Miranda rights. Id. One of the cases cited in his dissent is People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d
170, 366 N.E.2d 273, 397 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1977), wherein a police officer came upon a couple
having sexual relations in a secluded area. Id. at 172-73, 366 N.E.2d at 275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
615. When the officer questioned them, the defendant replied that "this is my woman." Id.
at 173, 366 N.E.2d at 275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 615. After being asked the woman's name, how-
ever, he responded that he did not know. Id. At the subsequent rape trial, the statements
made to the police officer were held admissible, even though the officer had not informed
the defendant of his Miranda rights. Id. at 178, 366 N.E.2d at 277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
One similarity among the three types of situations presented-the fourth amendment
emergency doctrine, the instances when Miranda warnings need not be given, and, the pro-
posed emergency exception to the right to counsel-apparently is that the nature of the
particular inquiry was unknown to the officer at the time of the alleged violation. Moreover,
in each situation, the officer seemingly had to ascertain the nature of the circumstances
which he was confronting, and a possibility existed that a crime had not even been commit-
ted. It is suggested, however, that these mere factual similarities, though notable, do not
justify recognition of a rule that could be applied in each situation.
202 Compare United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-73 (1980) with Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-02 (1966). In Hoffa, the Government used an informant to gather
information about the defendant, who in turn contended that, inter alia, his fourth amend-
ment right was violated. 385 U.S. at 300. The fourth amendment violation was said to have
occurred as a result of the informant's presence in the defendant's hotel room at various
times, thus rendering meaningless the consent to enter the room given by the defendant to
the informant. Id. The Court noted that the "Fourth Amendment can certainly be violated
by guileful as well as by forcible intrusions" and that the "protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.., can extend ... to oral statements." Id. at 301. The Court stated, however, that
no fourth amendment violation occurred since the amendment does not "[protect] a wrong-
doer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will
not reveal it." Id. at 302. In Henry, on the other hand, the Court considered whether the
Government's use of an informant violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to coun-
sel, holding that the deliberate "eliciting" of statements after the right to counsel attached
constituted a violation of the sixth amendment. Id. Aside from any fifth amendment consid-
erations, the Court observed, the use of an informant during the actual trial frustrates the
purpose of the right to counsel and the effective functioning of the adversary system. See id.
at 273.
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:615
an endangered victim, and thus, will hinder their investigatory ef-
forts.2 °0 This reasoning, however, apparently undermines the dis-
senters' reliance upon police classification of their own activity as
either investigatory, in which case the emergency exception will
shield obtained evidence, or accusatory, where the exception would
not apply.20 7 Indeed, if the police are concerned that information
obtained from a party who is represented by counsel eventually
will be suppressed, then it seems that the creation of an emergency
exception to the right to counsel would encourage improper classi-
fication of police conduct as investigatory, rather than accusatory,
in close factual situations.20 8 According the police this kind of dis-
200 See 57 N.Y.2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 1066, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (Wachtler, J., dis-
senting). Judge Wachtler sought to distinguish prior right to counsel cases on the ground
that the police in those cases had knowledge and evidence that a crime had been committed.
Id. at 182-83, 441 N.E.2d at 1066, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 548; see, e.g., People v. Skinner, 52
N.Y.2d 24, 27, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502, 436 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1980). Judge Wachtler observed
that, unlike the earlier cases, this case involved a "possibility that the life or safety of an
innocent third party, perhaps in imminent danger, might depend upon the success of the
police investigation." 57 N.Y.2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 1066, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 548. Thus, he
concluded, "[i]mposing the same restrictions on the police when they are attempting to res-
cue a person potentially in danger may, and in many cases undoubtedly will, have the added
consequence of contributing to the death or injury of the victim." Id. But see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ("it [cannot] lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adop-
tion of the exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement").
207 See supra note 191; infra note 208 and accompanying text.
108 In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Supreme Court stated that "when
the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory ... our adversary system begins to oper-
ate, and ... the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." Id. at 492. The
dissenters in Knapp, however, apparently were reluctant to require the police to determine
precisely when an "investigation" becomes "accusatory." See 57 N.Y.2d at 178-79, 441
N.E.2d at 1064, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Rather, Judge Wachtler stated
that the Court is not in a position to judge how the police investigation should be conducted
until there is no hope of finding the missing person alive. Id. at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 1069, 455
N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen also indicated that it is impractical
to require the police to be aware that the investigatory process has become accusatory, espe-
cially since "good police work" often will uncover criminal activity as the investigation pro-
ceeds. Id. at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 1064, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
The employment of police discretion, at the time an act which may amount to a consti-
tutional violation occurs, is prevalent in various areas of police procedure. For example, an
officer may make an arrest without a warrant when, in his discretion, probable cause exists.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963). To minimize the harm caused by a mis-
taken belief by a police officer that there was probable cause for the arrest, there are statu-
tory provisions, such as prompt arraignment statutes, e.g., CPL § 140.20(1) (1981), which
reduce the potential harm resulting from an improper arrest, see id. § 140.20(3) (1981) (re-
quiring pre-arraignment bail when unnecessary delay would result from awaiting arraign-
ment). In addition, the use of police discretion might be disadvantageous to an accused in
situations where decisions must be made as to whether, and how, to conduct a pre-trial
identification procedure. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (one man
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cretion would emasculate the very purpose of the right to coun-
sel-protection of an individual defendant from abuse of power by
the state.20 9 In addition, it is submitted that, given the urgency of a
"missing person" investigation, the zealousness of police investiga-
tory efforts will in no way be diminished. Therefore, it is suggested
that the creation of an emergency exception in the right to counsel
context is both unwarranted and unsound.
Lisa Schreibersdorf
showup in hospital room of witness acceptable even though highly suggestive). Notably, the
Supreme Court expressly has ruled that the right to counsel attaches at such a critical pre-
trial stage. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The right to counsel has been
deemed necessary in the early stages of a criminal prosecution because courts have recog-
nized that the police are in a position to infringe upon a suspect's constitutional rights
whenever he is in custody. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
209 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212 (1960). In Elkins, the Supreme Court
stated that the "purpose [of the right to counsel] is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it." Id.
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